The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy
H. R. McMaster (World Affairs) Part of our "Constant National Strategic Mistakes" series. Next up: Israel
Along with an assumption that the enemy would respond to American military action in a fairly predictable and reasonable manner, the proponents of concepts such as "Shock and Awe" and "Rapid Decisive Operations" believed, like the whiz kids before them, that technological prowess would free them from the enduring logic of warfare. In the years immediately prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, enthusiasm about a "defense transformation" epitomized American military thought. Advocates of this transformation believed that information, communications, surveillance, and precision strike capabilities had generated a revolution in military affairs that would deliver quick, cheap, efficient, and decisive victories in future wars. The language of defense transformation was hubristic—U.S. forces would enjoy "full spectrum dominance" over potential adversaries so long as they maintained a technological advantage. Once more, faith in American technological superiority had elevated a military capability to the level of strategy, and once more, the human element got lost in the enthusiasm for what seemed to present an easy and relatively painless solution to a complex, difficult problem.